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1 Introduction
The world has changed dramatically over the last
30 years. The Second World has virtually disappeared.
The Third World has gone in different directions,
with some areas declining and other areas
experiencing the fastest sustained economic growth
in history. And the First World, so jubilant over the
demise of the Second World (the fall of the Berlin
Wall and disintegration of the Soviet bloc), is now
struggling to maintain its high living standards against
competition from the formerly poor countries in the
East. The speed of industrialisation in China and
other Asian countries is breathtaking. They are not
just catching up, they have begun to drive the
changes in the rest of the world. This article is
particularly concerned with this rise of the East and
asks what it means for development studies. Does
development studies have a place in this new world?
Which strands have something to offer, which
strands should be discarded? What challenges need
to be taken on for development studies to thrive and
avoid becoming irrelevant?
The article starts by highlighting the rise of the East,
focusing in particular on the growth and
transformation of China. It then distinguishes
between four broad strands of development studies
and shows how each strand is affected by the rise of
the East. It concludes by discussing the need for a
new vocabulary to make sense of the new world and
– closely related to this – the need to break through
a psychological barrier: analysing how the former
‘periphery’ is now driving change in the ‘centre’.
Because the issues raised are large and so as to keep
the sweep, I have refrained from including literature
references. In order to provoke discussion, I have also
refrained from qualifying the main propositions with
footnotes.
2 The rise of the East
It is only 30 years ago that the ‘great proletarian
cultural revolution’ came to an end. The revolution
made China materially and culturally poor but
egalitarian in a way the world had not seen before.
Today the country is booming materially and culturally,
but it has also become a very unequal society. What
happened in China over this period is unbelievable:
30 years of economic growth at a yearly average of
9 per cent. Without exaggeration, Newsweek calls it
‘the most successful case of economic development
in human history’ (6 March 2006).
Full explanations of this growth and transformation
have yet to emerge but the key factors seem clear:
z Internally it was the unlikely combination of the
ideas of Adam Smith and the Chinese Communist
Party. Adam Smith’s central message was that
economic development depends on the depth of
the division of labour which in turn depends on the
size of the market. China’s internal market is big
and it is growing fast with the removal of internal
barriers and rising incomes. The depth of
specialisation within China is little recognised but it
is becoming visible to any visitor to industrial
clusters and the emerging ‘commodity markets’.
The contribution of the Chinese Communist Party
lies in governing this market and controlling the
transition to a new system. The Party experimented
with transitional institutions, which made it
possible to move in stages from a society without
private means of production to a capitalist society,
and which made it possible to move gradually from
a centrally planned to a market economy.
z Externally, the key explanatory factor lies in what
one can call ‘China plus’. The country’s rapid success
in global markets cannot be explained merely by
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reference to internal factors. One needs to consider
China plus key neighbours; China plus Hong Kong
and China plus multinational companies. To explain
each in turn: first, the equipment and complicated
components for many products ‘made in China’
come from neighbouring countries (in particular,
Korea, Taiwan and Japan). Second, China’s strength
in transforming these inputs into final products is
formidable but not sufficient; it was Hong Kong
that provided the trade networks and logistics to
link Chinese factories with their foreign customers.
Third, China is able to move rapidly into producing
more sophisticated products (in particular
electronics) because multinational companies have
established their factories – and in some cases also
research and development (R&D) departments – in
the country.
From a developmental viewpoint, China provides a
fascinating case study of a country that was poor
until relatively recently but is now catching up with
the advanced countries very fast indeed. The speed
and manner of this catching up is itself a very
interesting topic, central to the development debate,
and is one of the reasons why China has attracted
much attention internationally. The main reason,
however, for the global attention is that China’s rise
has major external repercussions. China and its
neighbours have become the drivers of global
change. At IDS, it has led us to open a new line of
research on what we are calling the ‘Asian Drivers of
Development’. We are trying to understand the
enormous opportunities that arise for some but also
the big threats confronted by others.
The positive and negative external effects are
significant because three things come together:
China’s size, fast growth and openness. The first two
are clear, the third less so. Trade in goods and
services (imports plus exports) amounts to around
70 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP),
compared with 25–30 per cent in the cases of the
USA, Japan or the European Union. China’s
economic growth has required huge increases in
imports and resulted in huge increases in exports.
This combination of large size, rapid growth and
openness is historically unprecedented.
The resulting effects are felt throughout the world.
Countries in Latin America, Africa and the rest of
Asia feel the difference – as do the advanced
countries of North America and Western Europe.
We have reached a new stage in the development of
the global economy. The former periphery has
become the driver of change in the (former?) centre.
Those tempted to rejoice might want to hold back
with their celebration. Enormous new problems have
emerged, both internal and external to China.
Starting with the external: feeding the dragon requires
natural resources, which China lacks. International
resource wars loom over water and fuel. The internal
problems are many, for example 16 of the 20 most
air-polluted cities in the world are in China;
inequality is increasing rapidly within cities and
between regions; massive bad debts highlight the
danger of financial instability. In short, there are
doubts about the economic and political
sustainability of further growth, but so far, there is
little sign of a slow-down.
My own impression is that reference to the herd
instinct is essential to help explain the current
situation. Most Chinese investors (public and private)
seem to believe that fast growth will continue;
foreign investors (large and small) believe that China
is the place to be, and the government matches this
enthusiasm with massive infrastructure investment.
So with one reinforcing the other, continued fast
growth becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. But there
is no inevitability in this process. The Chinese
government has the financial and political power to
intervene. Over the last 30 years, it has used this
power in remarkably shrewd ways – experimenting
and finding unorthodox solutions in the process.
Whatever scenario one believes in for China and East
Asia, there is little doubt that we have entered a
new chapter in world history. But those taking the
long view might say that history is merely getting
back on track – with Asia resuming its superior and
dominant place in the world. In contrast, this article
is comparatively short term, stretching back over the
last 30 years – or at the most 50 or so years when
development studies began.
3 What is ‘development studies’?
What does the rise of the East, in particular China,
mean for development studies? This is the question
driving this article. Answering this question requires
defining what ‘development studies’ is. This is not an
easy task. There is no agreed definition and
controversy is inevitable if one tries to provide one.
I adopt here a pragmatic definition which comes
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from observing what development studies institutes
(e.g. members of the UK’s Development Studies
Association) actually do. They:
z study economies, societies, polities in Africa, Latin
America and Asia
z consider OECD countries only to the extent that
they have an influence on or serve as reference
points for African, Latin American and Asian
countries
z are (or strive to be) interdisciplinary and multi-
method in their approach.
This descriptive definition has its problems. It gives the
impression that development studies is a branch of
Area Studies with specialists in, for example East
Africa or South Asia – on a par with specialists in, for
instance, North America or Scandinavia. No doubt
country- or region-specific expertise is considered
important but most development studies researchers
would claim that they have something more
fundamental in common:
z the need for analytical frameworks and concepts
which capture the different stages, structures and
attitudes in Africa, Latin America and Asia
(different from those found in OECD countries)
z the concern to understand poverty and inequality,
analyse its causes and show ways of improving
people’s life chances (which are often much
worse than those found in OECD countries).
Whichever way one defines development studies, any
detailed discussion will quickly find the need to
distinguish between different strands. Again there are
different ways of identifying strands, none of them
right or wrong, but more or less useful depending on
the purpose of the exercise. Since this article is
particularly concerned with the rise of the East and
its implications for development studies, it seems
important to pay attention to the strands which
(continue to) analyse reality through the Western lens
and those which regard Western dominance as the
key obstacle for progress. But two other strands of
development studies will also be examined. I will call
them ‘find your own way’ and ‘putting the poor first’.
These four strands do not cover all work carried out
under the rubric of development, but they capture
major lines of work that have been carried out across
the disciplines. I have deliberately kept away from
disciplinary discussion. If there is any pride left in
belonging to development studies, it resides in being
able to observe strengths and weaknesses across the
disciplines.
4 ‘West is best’ or ‘the overdue burial’
The first strand of development studies to be
examined here is one which has been influential
since the 1950s and continues to be so up to this day:
adopting the Western lens. I refer here to those
studies which analyse, interpret and measure by using
a Western reference point. Often this reference
point is an idealised version of Western practice: the
achievement society, the market economy,
parliamentary democracy, the innovation system.
Typically, these studies ask in which respect does
reality in, for example Bangladesh, differ from a
model defined elsewhere (usually in the West); why
does the reality not live up to this model? What
needs to be done to close the gap?
Such questions pervade all disciplines. In sociology, the
Western lens was particularly powerful because of the
strong influence of modernisation theory.
Development was seen by most modernisation
theorists as the evolution from traditional to modern
society. Progress could be assessed by indicators of
modernity, derived from the experience of the most
advanced modern society: the USA. Most
contemporary sociologists would dissociate themselves
from such thinking, but the practice of adopting the
idealised Western lens remains surprisingly common in
many lines of research and policymaking:
z Political science and the push for
democratisation. Western-style democracy is
considered so superior that it is thought legitimate
to introduce it by force. Little consideration is
given to other forms of participation which might
look second best but turn out to be more
meaningful to local people and give them the
chance to find their own ‘voice’.
z Economics and the investment climate. The
rediscovery of the importance of economic
growth has led to concern with improving the
climate for investment. Particular importance is
given to the institutional infrastructure (legally
enforceable property rights and contracts). The
concern with institutions seems right but using
models derived from the West provides few
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insights for moving forward in countries where
such institutions are absent.
z Innovation studies and the search for systemic
gains. Participating in the global economy seems
essential for improving earning opportunities but
how to escape the ‘race to the bottom’?
Competing by innovating is seen as part of the
answer but does the innovation system approach
(derived originally from Scandinavian experiences)
provide a fruitful analytical and practical way
forward? Probably not.
Many other examples could be given. Unfortunately,
they are not limited to academia. They seem even
more common in advisory and consultancy work.
Overwhelmed by the complexity of the real world,
the German consultant often retreats to what he
knows best and derives his recommendations by
comparing Central Java with Baden-Wuerttemberg.
Japanese consultants seem no better. On the
contrary, much of their work consists of lamenting
that the developing regions are not like Japan and
then making recommendations based on the
Japanese experience. In some form or other they
repeat the mistaken choice of the modernisation
theorists: adopt the best practice of the most
advanced region or remain underdeveloped.
I am not arguing here against learning from success.
I have emphasised that the idea of ‘West is best’ (or
‘Japanese is best’) continues to be prominent. This
seems problematic for two reasons. Transplanting
ideas and practices without due consideration to
differences in context rarely works. This is old hat but
deserves to be repeated time and again. The second
reason is new and brings us back to the central
concern of this article. The legitimacy of adopting the
Western lens always rested on the superior
performance of the Western economies and societies.
This superiority is increasingly questionable. China’s
growth record over the last 30 years is superior to
anything Western nations have ever achieved in their
long history. China’s ability to manage the transition
from a materially impoverished, centrally planned
economy to an efficient state-governed market
economy is superior to that of the obvious
comparator: the Soviet Union. Even though the Soviet
Union started at a higher level, and even though (or
because) it adopted many ideas recommended by
Western advisers, the ex-Soviet republics are being
overtaken by China on many fronts.
The key point of this section is that the ‘West is best’
idea, which has long been suspect, has now lost its last
bit of legitimacy. For a long time, this way of analysing
and advising derived its justification from the
superiority of the Western models and practices. Now
that the East is out-competing the West and
demonstrating more effective ways forward, using the
Western model as a reference point – or the model to
live up to – is hard to justify. The burial is overdue.
5 The West undermines
The previous section discussed – and dismissed – the
influential body of literature which explicitly or
implicitly sees development as progress towards
idealised Western models. In the conventional
political spectrum, this can be seen as literature
leaning to the right. In contrast, much of the
literature leaning to the left sees development as a
process which has been disrupted, undermined or
stifled by the West. This includes the classical
theories of imperialism, which precede development
studies, neo-Marxist theory of underdevelopment,
dependency theory, world systems theory, and more
recently, some of the anti-globalisation work, for
example John Pilger’s 2001 programme for ITV, The
New Rulers of the World. In spite of differences
between them, there is a common core: they regard
the interaction with the West as the main obstacle
to development.
What does the rise of the East tell us about this body
of work? If one is restricted to a short answer, one has
little choice but to dismiss it as overtaken by events.
China trades intensively with the West (and everybody
else), no other country has received more foreign
direct investment from the West, no other country
absorbs Western technology and design more
enthusiastically, no other country sends more students
to Western universities. China’s fast growth would not
have been possible without integrating deeply into a
global economy dominated by the West. Bill Warren –
the British Marxist who in the late 1970s and early
1980s so severely criticised his colleagues on the left –
has won the argument: capitalism is fulfilling its
historical mission in the developing world. More than
that, in East Asia it has been so successful that it is
now driving the change in the West.
A more detailed answer would be useful here:
z The writers in the imperialism/dependency/anti-
globalisation strand are right to draw attention to
Schmitz The Rise of the East: What Does it Mean for Development Studies?54
the relationship with the West as important, but
wrong to assume that the relationship is always
negative. The outcome depends on the
circumstances. For example, global value chain
analysis suggests that the upgrading opportunities
of local producers vary with the way the chains
are organised. In the case of foreign direct
investment, the outcome for national
development depends on the terms which the
state has been able to negotiate. The East Asian
experience shows that national policy helps to be
selective with regard to foreign direct investment
and then harness the muscle of transnational
companies to national development.
z Some of this strand recognises that the outcome
depends on the interaction between external and
internal forces but propose that the outcome is
negative for the majority of the population. This
proposition turns out to be right in many
instances in Latin America but much less so for
East Asia, giving rise to a host of new research
questions for which we do not seem to have
convincing answers: why is it that enterprises,
local government and central government show
so much more strategic intent in East Asia?
z While it is right to draw attention to the
importance of external forces, the new external
forces come increasingly from the East rather
than the West. This is why IDS has initiated the
Asian Drivers programme. China in particular is
driving global changes in:
(a) the quantity and direction of trade (resulting in
major changes in relative prices)
(b) the way production and trade are organised
(resulting in a shift in locus of coordination of
global value chains)
(c) the location of innovation activities (prompting
a shift in the global knowledge divide)
(d) global governance (leading to a new unstable
multipolarity).
None of this is to suggest that these changes
driven by the East produce better developmental
outcomes. The outcomes are likely to vary a great
deal.
z Couching the change as being Western- or
Eastern-driven has its problems. In some sectors,
the success of China is due to Western
companies’ massive investment in factories,
supplier development, research facilities, and
managerial and technical staff in China. In other
sectors, East Asian companies have substantial
investment in the West. And there are sectors in
which new multinational companies originating
from South Africa, Mexico, Brazil, India or Russia
are challenging old and new leaders from the
West and East. The corporate world has become
truly transnational. Understanding this new
corporate world is not easy, but critical for a
revitalised development studies.
z The idea that these transnationals will now rule
the world is also unhelpful. In many sectors, there
has been a major change:
(a) from transnational conglomerates prioritising
control
(b) to rapidly changing alliances of companies
which prioritise core competence and strategic
flexibility.
In many sectors, an organisational decomposition has
occurred, not just in production processes but also in
marketing and innovation processes. The much-
lamented decline in state powers has its parallel in
fragmenting corporate power. The world is much less
predictable and more exciting than most of us would
have expected a few years ago.
6 Find your own way
There is another strand of development studies which
not only survives but is boosted by the rise of the
East. I call it ‘finding your own way’. Like the other
strands discussed before, it can be detected among
writers from several disciplines. ‘Find your own way’
has been advocated by many, but as a research
perspective, it has been practised surprisingly little. It
certainly requires an open-mindedness which the two
previously discussed strands do not allow.
Its most explicit author was the historian Alexander
Gerschenkron. In his book Economic Backwardness in
Historical Perspective (1962) he argued that latecomers
have to plot their own distinctive path of
development. Repeating what others have tried
before is rarely possible because each country has its
own specific internal conditions and because the rise
of the early developer changes the external
conditions for the latecomer. Analysis of early
industrialisation in continental Europe led
Gerschenkron to this conclusion. Ron Dore came to
the same conclusion in his analysis of Japan: the
country succeeded by not simply emulating the
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West. Non-blinkered analysis of the more recent
East Asian experience takes us in the same direction.
The key feature of China’s development strategy and
that of other East Asian countries is that they did not
follow models from elsewhere. In Institutions and
Economic Growth, Stephan Haggard (2004) emphasised
how East Asia succeeded through a long process of
‘transition’ that was highly experimental in nature.
Similarly, Mike Hobday, in a 2003 review of Asian
industrial development, concludes that it is diversity
rather than uniformity in the institutional arrangements
and development policy that characterises the
innovation experience of the Asian Tigers.
The importance of step-by-step experimentation
comes out most strongly in the Chinese experience
of the last three decades. Yingyi Quian shows this
convincingly in his article ‘How Reform Worked in
China’ (2003). ‘Transitional institutions’ rather than
‘best practice institutions’ were the key. He stresses
that the adopted institutions need to take account of
the conditions at each stage of the reform process.
In China, a market was created through a dual-track
approach to liberalisation, enterprises were created
through the non-conventional ownership of
township–village enterprises, and government was
reformed through a particular type of fiscal
federalism. These institutional innovations worked for
a while and then had to be replaced. Not all of them
succeeded but there was a common thread to those
that did: ‘pragmatic innovation’ and aligning the
interests of the newly enabled decentralised actors
with those of the reformers in central government.
By implication, this strand of development studies,
which stresses the need to find one’s own way
forward, also warns us against seeking to replicate
elsewhere what seems to have worked in East Asia.
Each country needs to find its own way forward,
based on understanding its own strengths and
weaknesses and based on understanding the new
external context which has been influenced in such a
major way by the Asian Tigers and China.
In principle, proponents of this line of development
studies should be able to push at open doors.
Economics, the dominant discipline in development
studies, has finally taken an ‘institutional turn’,
recognising that institutions need more attention in
research and advice. In practice, however, this has
not led to greater space for context-specific
solutions. As stressed by Peter Evans (2004), the
attention given to getting the institutions right has
led to ‘institutional monocropping’, advocating the
same way forward in vastly different circumstances.
One of the main reasons seems to lie in the internal
organisational dynamics of donor agencies. A large
part of development research and advice is funded by
donor agencies that operate in many countries. The
agencies seek internal coherence around particular
aims and approaches; they seek to disburse funds for
activities which can be shown to promote these aims
and use these approaches. There is thus a conflict
between respecting diversity and the priorities of
recipients on the one hand, and the agency’s internal
aims and pressures on the other. Because of the need
to disburse funds against deadlines, the scope for
letting poor countries find their own way in their
own time is constrained, particularly in aid-dependent
countries. It remains to be seen whether the change
to budget support will make a significant difference.
7 Putting the poor first
Some of the finest achievements of development
studies lie in the analysis of employment, inequality
and poverty in Africa, Asia and Latin America. These
issues were put on the agenda of both the academic
and policy debate by the three International Labour
Organization Missions to Colombia, Sri Lanka and
Kenya in the early 1970s. Ever since, development
studies has been concerned with ‘redistribution from
growth’ and with tracing the implications of policies
or projects for poor people.
IDS is closely associated with this. When Dudley Seers
asked in his 1972 book ‘What we are trying to
measure?’, he brought out the importance of going
beyond growth and measuring the implications for
inequality and poverty. Today we have a sophisticated
human development index (to which Richard Jolly – a
former IDS Director – contributed so much) and we
have a new participatory methodology for observing
changes through the eyes of the poor (pioneered at
IDS by Robert Chambers and the Participation
Group). This is a proud legacy, which has led to reams
of in-depth poverty analysis and has been very
influential in the policy debate worldwide.
For many, this analysis of the poor has become the
trademark of development studies. The mission is to
focus on the poor and on the poorest countries. While
filling a vacuum and reflecting strongly held values of
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researchers and practitioners, it has also become a
problem. Targeting the poorest directly and
immediately is often given priority in discussions of
research design and funding. This leads to development
studies being reduced to studying the dependent
variable. I am not implying here that the poor are
passive: there are impressive stories of the poor
organising to defend their rights, as shown by the self-
employed women’s association in India, the street
traders’ union in South Africa, or the landless rural
workers’ movement in Brazil. The point I am trying to
make is that where development studies confines itself
to the study of the poor, it runs the risk of giving up on
understanding and influencing the forces, which bring
about the big changes and differentials in wealth and
poverty. This is not a straw man: some researchers have
willingly cut themselves off from the big picture, others
have failed to obtain funding because they did not deal
with the poor directly.
How does all this relate to the rise of the East? If
development studies defines itself as the study of the
poor and of the poorest countries, then studying the
rise of the East is not a central concern.
Development studies would perhaps contribute to
analysing poverty within East Asia, but would
concentrate on the poorer countries in the rest of
Asia, Latin America and in particular Africa. Many aid
agencies have gone along this route. Should
development studies as well? Should it concentrate
on the ‘rump’ of the developing world?
In my view, this would be a grave mistake. It fails to
recognise that China and the East Asian production
system have become drivers of change worldwide,
including Latin America, Africa and the rest of Asia.
What is at stake is whether development studies is
concerned with the dynamics that drive this change.
Of course, what happens in the rest of the world is
not only determined by the East, but this is where
the main changes come from. And the effects are
not just felt in Africa, Latin America and Asia, they
are felt also, or perhaps even more so, in North
America, Western Europe and Japan. It is a true
revolution: what used to be part of the ‘periphery’ is
now driving changes in the ‘centre’. Perhaps
development studies should put this reversal on its
research agenda. This would show that it has – at
last – freed itself from its post-colonial origins.
Development studies is certainly well equipped to
take on this new challenge. Unlike most other bodies
of work it has a tradition of interdisciplinary analysis,
of combining different methods and drawing on the
tools developed by other disciplines.
8 Finding a new language
As shown in the course of this brief article, the rise
of the East poses major challenges to development
studies. I have suggested that one strand should be
discarded, two need to reposition themselves and
only one strand comes out strongly. No doubt, some
of the arguments which led to these conclusions are
controversial, but hopefully there is less controversy
on what I would call the two minimum requirements
for moving forward:
z more analytical space for detecting the ‘solutions’
which come up from below, and
z capturing the global changes which produce
wealth and poverty.
The latter requires more than international studies, it
necessitates enquiry along the global–local axis.
For development studies to reinvent itself and be at
the forefront of new analysis, rather than a relic
from the past, it needs to confront a number of
further challenges. These challenges arise not just
from the rise of the East but also from changes
elsewhere. I will merely raise them here, without
being able to go into detail, let alone offer solutions.
Current analysis and communication is hampered by
poor language. The most frequently used categories
– ‘developed/developing countries’ or ‘North/South’
do not help us to understand the new world. Over
the last 30 years, the former Third World has
become so heterogeneous that the use of current
categories becomes an obstacle. Brazil and Tanzania
have very little in common. China and Sri Lanka
similarly. The terms ‘newly industrialised countries’
and ‘least-developed countries’ are an improvement,
but still not sufficient.
The most grotesque category is that of ‘industrialised’
countries for the countries of the OECD (given that
de-industrialisation has been one of their main
characteristics in recent years). In English, this has
become less common but not yet in other languages,
for example in German, ‘Industrieländer’ is the most
frequently used term.
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Creating a new language which is universally
acceptable and has measurable categories will be
difficult. A strong candidate is a typology of countries
according to sources of state revenue. Such typology
would help to bring about an overdue shift to more
political analysis. At IDS Mick Moore has shown that
state revenue based on taxation (as opposed to
foreign aid or export of abundant raw materials) has
a major bearing on the likelihood of state formation
and effective government. There now seems a case
for going one step further and using this line of work
on taxation for a categorisation of countries. In
discussing this and other candidates, some might
worry about a proliferation of terms used
concurrently, but this is unlikely to do more damage
than continuing with the current language for
distinguishing between (groups of) countries.
The problem of course is that there are enormous
country-internal differences. Osvaldo Sunkel captured
this very well in a 1973 article ‘Transnational Integration
and National Disintegration’. His central concern was
to show the connection between, on the one hand,
the economic and cultural integration across countries
and, on the other hand, the economic and cultural
disintegration within countries. This is precisely what
happened in Latin America at the time. And is precisely
what has happened in East Asia since then. The
difference is that the transnational integration has been
much deeper and wider in East Asia and the drivers of
the process come increasingly from within the region.
Why is it that Sunkel’s combined analysis of
transnational integration and national disintegration has
not entered the mainstream of development studies
and produced measurable categories to understand this
process more deeply and comparatively? Perhaps the
original article was too close to dependency analysis
and its pessimistic conclusions.
The transnational integration keeps reproducing itself
and the resulting process of inclusion and exclusion
changes the world in a fascinating and outrageous
way. Understanding this world requires a language
which revolves around connectivity or the lack of it.
Such language exists for example in global value
chain analysis and in social network analysis, but it
needs to be brought into the centre of the new
development studies. The challenge is to understand:
z the business and professional networks that make
transnational integration work
z the disconnects and lock-outs that lead to misery
and injustice, often across national borders
z the new and invisible transnational networks that
terrorise the world
z the policy networks that need to be developed
along the local–global axis.
This is not to suggest that we abandon a concern
with the national or local state. What seems needed
is a shift in paradigm about what the state needs to
do. The critical capacity of the future state is the
management of relationships. Managing relationships
is not an end in itself but is critical for securing peace,
integrating different cultures, accelerating private
investment, delivering services to the poor and many
other state functions. Once the management of
relationships is at the centre of new analytical and
practical work, it becomes more likely that we will
escape futile linear ideas of policymaking and find a
framework for dealing with the proliferation of actors
that have an influence on policy.
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